State of Utah v. Eugene Frank Torres : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1979
State of Utah v. Eugene Frank Torres : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Bruce C. Lubeck; Attorney for Appellant;
Robert Hansen; Attorney for Respondent;
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, State v. Torres, No. 16629 (Utah Supreme Court, 1979).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/1912
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v-
EUGENE FRANK TORRES, Case No. 16629 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a jury verdict of guilty and dgit, 
based thereon by the Honorable David B. Dee, Judge 
Judicial District Court. 
ROBERT HANSEN 
Attorney General 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorney for Respondent 
:,: .· 
BRUCE C. LUBECK 
Salt Lake Legal De 
333 South Second E 
Salt Lake City, ~ 
Attorney for Appel'la 
;.t! 
~~ 
FILE d\{} 
SEP 13 1979 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v-
EUGENE FRANK TORRES, Case No. 16629 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a jury verdict of guilty and the judgment 
based thereon by the Honorable David B. Dee, Judge of the Third 
Judicial District Court. 
ROBERT HANSEN 
Attorney General 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorney for Respondent 
BRUCE C. LUBECK 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc. 
333 South Second East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Appellant 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN FAILING TO 
INSTRUCT IN ACCORDANCE WITH APPELLANT'S REQUEST 
CONCERNING THE BURDEN OF PROOF RELATING TO SELF 
PAGE 
1 
1 
1 
2 
DEFENSE 4 
CONCLUSION. . . . . . . . 8 
CASES CITED 
State v. Denny, 579 P.2d 1101 (Ariz. 1978). 
State v. Garcia, 560 P.2d 1224 (Ariz. 1977) 
State v. Jackson, 528 P.2d 145 (Utah 1974). 
6,7 
7 
5 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v-
EUGENE FRANK TORRES, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 16629 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged by Information with the crime of 
Aggravated Assault wherein he was alleged to have assaulted a 
Salt Lake City Police Officer with a deadly weapon on September 
16, 1978. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The matter was tried before the Honorable David B. Dee 
sitting with a jury on April 18 and 19, 1979. Appellant was found 
guilty of the charge and was committed to the Utah State Prison 
for the term provided by law, zero to five years. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks the reversal of the conviction and a 
remand for a new trial. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
A Salt Lake City Police Officer, John Foster, was in the 
vicinity of 1300 South State on September 16, 1978, at approxi-
mately midnight when he saw a fight and saw two men chasing 
two other men (R. 109-122). Officer Foster testified that 
appellant was one of the men chasing two other persons and that 
he, Officer Foster, stopped appellant and appellant challenged 
him to a fight (R. 124,131). A crowd was forming in the area and 
numerous people were gathered about. Officer Foster testified 
that appellant then left the scene running and Officer Foster gave ' 
chase on foot. According to the officer appellant stopped and 
again challenged the officer to a fight and kicked at the officer 
(R. 133,137,138). The officer testified that in his own defense 
he swung his nightstick whereupon appellant grabbed the officer 
and threw him to the ground and hit him over the head several 
times with the nightstick (R. 141,142). When appellant ran away 
from the officer appellant was not under arrest nor had he been 
handcuffed (R. 154, 158). 
A citizen who was visiting a nearby business establishment, 
Michael Jackson, testified that he saw basically the same thing as 
Officer Foster related but from a short distance away. 
Appellant testified that he was involved in an altercation 
at the scene with other parties and those other parties were 
responsible for inflicting a cut injury on appellant's arm (R. 2671 
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Appellant testified that when the officer arrived, the officer 
grabbed appellant and not the other persons responsible for appel-
lant's injury and slapped appellant on the side of the head (R. 268). 
Appellant admitted verbally giving the police officer a difficult 
time and calling him names and challenging him to fight. Appellant 
then left the scene by running away and when he saw Officer Foster 
was chasing him he testified that he turned and said "I give up, man" 
(R. 270). According to appellant Officer Foster moved towards 
appellant with a nightstick swinging and appellant was hit in the 
midsection and was almost hit in the head by one of the swings, 
and so in his own defense, appellant grabbed the police officer 
and threw him to the ground (R. 271, 272). As the officer fell 
to the ground the nightstick was dropped and appellant picked it, 
and appellant testified that he saw the officer's hand go for the 
officer's gun, and fearing that he would be shot, he hit the officer 
three or four times with the nightstick and then ran away (R. 273, 
275, 276). 
Other persons who were with appellant, Robert Baca and 
Samuel Torres, testified similarly to appellant and said that the 
police officer was swinging his nightstick at appellant and when 
the police officer went down he was reaching for his gun before 
appellant hit him with the nightstick (R. 226,230,232,245,248). 
The State produced a rebuttal witness who was a citizen 
observing the events and he basically confirmed the testimony 
of Officer Foster and rebutted the testimony of appellant's wit-
- 3 -
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nesses. 
The jury deliberated from approximately 4:30 p.m. to 11:10 
p.m. before returning a verdict of guilty (R. 316). 
ARGUMENT 
POUlT I 
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN FAILING TO INSTRUCT IN 
ACCORDANCE WITH APPELLANT'S REQUEST CONCERNING 
THE BURDEN OF PROOF RELATING TO SELF DEFENSE. 
Appellant contends that the court below made reversi-
ble error in failing to instruct the jury properly on the burden 
of proof necessary in a self defense case. The Court instructed 
on the general principles of self defense (R. 85). This was given 
at appellant's request (R. 58). However, the Court erred in not 
instructing the jury on the burden of proof in such matters. 
Appellant in his Requested Instruction No. 9 (R. 62) requested 
the following instruction: 
You are instructed that Mr. Torres need not 
prove that the assault was justified to any 
particular degree of proof. If upon the 
whole testimony, both for the State and for 
the defendant, you have a reasonable doubt 
as to whether or not Mr. Torres acted in 
self defense, he is entitled to an acquittal. 
That is, if Mr. Torres produces sufficient 
evidence of justification to raise a reason-
able doubt as to whether the assault was 
justified or not, he is entitled to an ac-
quittal. 
Prior to the jury being instructed a conference on jury 
- 4 -
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instructions was held and appellant excepted to the failure of 
the Court to give that proposed instruction (R. 264, 265). 
Appellant contended in the court below and contends now that the 
proposed instruction was taken directly from decisions of this 
Court and must be given in a self defense case so that the jury 
is clear as to what is necessary to be proven. 
Of course the instructions must be read as a whole but 
the only instruction given dealing with burden of proof is the 
general instruction that the defendant is presumed innocent and 
is not to be convicted unless his guilt is proved beyond a reason-
able doubt (R. 77). No other instructions were given dealing with 
burden of proof and what must be shown by defendant to obtain an 
acquittal on the issue of self defense. 
This Court has often repeated the rule appellant sought 
in his instruction in the court below. For example, in State v. 
Jackson, 528 P.2d 145 (Utah 1974), this Court dealt with a case 
where the defendant claimed self defense after being convicted 
in a manslaughter case. The Court said: 
It is the law of this jurisdiction that a 
defendant is not required to establish his 
claim of self defense beyond a reasonable 
doubt or by a preponderance of the evidence. 
A defendant is entitled to an acquittal 
if based upon the whole evidence in the 
case there is a reasonable doubt as to 
whether or not the defendant acted in self 
defense. 
Before and after the Jackson case this Court has reiterated 
that same rule in cases too numerous to require citation. It is 
- 5 -
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clearly the rule in the State of Utah that the burden remains with 
the State to prove guilt on all elements beyond a reasonable doubt 
and if the defendant's evidence of self defense creates a reason· 
able doubt as to whether or not he acted in self defense he is 
entitled to an acquittal. 
This Court has not dealt specifically with such a requestea 
instruction but. other state courts have recently done so. For 
example, inStatev. Denny, 579P.2dll01(Ariz.1978) the Supreme 
Court of Arizona reversed and remanded the case where the defendant 
had been convicted of involuntary manslaughter. The defendant 
claimed self defense and on appeal cited as error the fact that 
the jury was not properly instructed on the defendant's burden of 
proof in defense of self defense. The Arizona Supreme Court re· 
versed the conviction and held: 
Although the trial court instructed the jury 
that the burden of proving the defendant 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt is upon the 
State and that this burden never shifts during 
the trial, an instruction should have been 
given to make it clear to the jury that the 
defendant did not have to prove she acted 
in self defense, but that she merely had to 
raise a reasonable doubt that she was justi-
fied in shooting her husband. 
The Court's reasoning for such a rule was stated thusly: 
The very purpose of a jury charge is to flag 
the juror's attention to concepts that must 
not be misunderstood, such as reasonable 
doubt and burden of proof [citations]. It 
is vital that the jury not misunderstand the 
concept of the defendant's burden of proof 
on self defense; the jury must be instructed 
with great care to prevent the misunderstand-
ing of this concept. 
- 6 -
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In the Denny case the Arizona Supreme Court relied in part on 
State v. Garcia, 560 P.2d 1224 (Ariz. 1977), a case which reversed 
and remanded for a new trial a conviction for assault with a deadly 
weapon because the jury was not properly instructed on the burden 
of proof ev_en though the jury was "extensively instructed as to 
the burden of proof." Generally, the instructions dealing with 
the burden of proof as to self defense were inadequate. 
In this case a reading of the transcript makes it clear 
that appellant did not deny hitting Officer Foster but claimed 
only that he was acting in self defense out of fear for his life 
after he had been hit by the officer for no apparent reason and 
after it appeared to him and others that the officer was reaching 
for his gun. The only issue in the trial was whether or not 
appellant acted in self defense and that fact is made clear by a 
reading of the entire transcript. Appellant requested numerous 
instructions dealing with self defense and the Court, appellant 
argues, correctly saw that there was an issue of self defense and 
that there was sufficient evidence to warrant the giving of a 
general instruction on self defense from our statute. However, 
the court below erred fatally in failing to give some of the 
other instructions, specifically the one appellant complains of 
here, and thereby simply told the jury that there was such a 
thing as self defense but did not make it clear to the jury what 
must be shown and by whom for them to reach a proper verdict. 
Appellant contends that where the only issue at trial 
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was whether or not appellant acted in self defense that the fail-
ure to give such a proposed instruction, properly excepted to 
when the Court indicated it was not going to give such an instruc· 
tion, is reversible error. 
CONCI.USION 
For the reason above stated, that the Court below erred 
in not properly instructing the jury on the burden of proof 
necessary in a self defense case, appellant respectfully submits 
that the conviction should be reversed and the matter remanded 
for a new trial. 
DATED this __ day of September, 1979. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BRUCE C. LUBECK 
Attorney for Appellant 
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